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chapter.1 Introduction
There are two opposing views concerning the expectations hypothesis in economics and ﬁnance.
According to the traditional, neoclassical view, propagated by Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972)
agents form rational expectations (RE) without any systematic forecasting mistakes. In the rational
framework it is often assumed that agents have full knowledge of their economic environment,
and use all available information from economic theory to compute rational forecast. Moreover,
typically it is assumed that all agents are fully rational, leading to the representative rational agent
benchmark. Friedman (1953) provided an early argument in support of the representative rational
agent framework, namely that irrational agents would be driven out of the market, since rational
agents earn higher proﬁts or utility. Stated differently, evolutionary selection prevents irrational
behaviour and the economy may be described as if all agents are perfectly rational.
Simon(1957)alreadycriticizedthisview, arguingthatdeliberationandinformationgatheringcosts
should be taken into account. More recently, work on bounded rationality in the 1990s, surveyed
e.g. in Sargent (1993) and Conlisk (1996)), has challenged the traditional view, emphasizing that
the extreme assumptions concerning perfect knowledge of the economy and inﬁnite computing
capacities are highly unrealistic and in sharp contrast with observed behavior in laboratory ex-
periments with human subjects (e.g. Tversky and Kahnemann (1974)). In macroeconomics, much
workhasbeen doneon adaptivelearning, as surveyede.g. inEvansandHonkapohja(2001). A key
underlying assumption is that agents do not know the underlying “law of motion” of the economy,
but instead use time series observations to form expectations based upon their own “perceived law
of motion”, trying to learn the model parameters as more observations become available. Much of
this literature has focussed on the stability of rational expectations equilibria (REE) and equilib-
rium selection, in an attempt to justify rationality by adaptive learning.
Stimulated by work at the Santa Fe Institute, the view that markets are complex evolving systems
has gained popularity, see e.g. the Santa Fe conference proceedings Anderson et al. (1988) and
Arthur et al. (1997a), the collection of papers in Rosser (2004) and the recent survey in Arthur
(2006). When the economy is viewed as a complex system with many interacting agents, it seems
1hard to justify perfect structural knowledge about the economy and fully rational expectations,
since knowledge about the beliefs of all other agents would be required. A large population of
boundedly rational heterogeneous agents, using different forecasting rules ranging from simple to
sophisticated, seems much more natural and in line with human behavior. A problem of bounded
rationality however is that there are many degrees of freedom, and which model of bounded ratio-
nality is an accurate description of learning behaviour at the individual level?
In this chapter we review some work on bounded rationality, expectation formation and learning
in complex markets. We will use the familiar demand-supply cobweb model, exactly the same
framework employed by Muth (1961), in his seminal paper introducing rational expectations. We
emphasize two stories of bounded rationality, one story of adaptive learning and another story
of evolutionary selection; at the end of the chapter we combine both stories. An important point
of departure for both stories is that agents do not understand the world in its full complexity, but
have some simple perception of this complex world and use relatively simple decision heuristics
or forecasting rules. According to the ﬁrst adaptive learning story agents are identical, and can
be represented by an “average agent”, who adapts his behavior trying to learn an optimal rule
within a class of simple rules. An example is the consistent expectations equilibrium proposed by
Hommes and Sorger (1998), where agents try to learn the best linear rule, minimizing forecasting
errors, in an unknown nonlinear economy. The optimal linear rule ﬁts the observable sample mean
and sample autocorrelation structure of the nonlinear economy. The second story is concerned
with heterogeneous, interacting agents and evolutionary selection of different forecasting rules.
Heterogeneous agent models are becoming increasingly popular in ﬁnance, where a distinction
between fundamentalists and chartist trading strategies can be made; see e.g. Hommes (2006) and
LeBaron (2006) for extensive surveys. Here, we consider the adaptive belief systems proposed
by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), where agents can choose between a costly sophisticated
forecasting strategy, such as rational expectations, and a freely available simple strategy, such
as naive expectations. At the end of the chapter, we will integrate both stories and consider an
economy with evolutionary selection between a costly sophisticated adaptive learning rule and a
cheap simple forecasting rule such as naive expectations.
2There is a lot of theoretical work on expectations formation and learning when agents are bound-
edly rational, but surprisingly little experimental work on expectations and learning of human
subjects has been done. A controlled laboratory environment is well suited to investigate how in-
dividuals form expectations and learn from experience, and how the market aggregates individual
forecasting strategies. Recently, Hommes et al. (2007) conducted experiments on expectation for-
mation within a cobweb framework. We confront theoretical work on expectation formation and
learning with the observed “stylized facts” in these laboratory experiments.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses cobweb dynamics under various expec-
tations rules, such as naive, rational and adaptive expectations. Section 3 focuses on laboratory
experiments with human subjects on expectation formation. In Section 4 we discuss adaptive
learning, in particular the notion of consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) and sample au-
tocorrelation (SAC-)learning. Section 5 focuses on heterogeneity and evolutionary competition
between different forecasting rules and ends with an example where adaptive learning and evolu-
tionary selection are combined. Finally, Section 6 brieﬂy discusses a future perspective.
2 The Cobweb Model
Theclassicalcobwebmodelisapartialequilibriummodeldescribingcommoditypriceﬂuctuations
of a non-storable good, such as corn or hogs, that takes one time period to produce. It is one of the
simplest benchmark models in economic dynamics and can be found in many standard textbooks
(e.g. Nicholson (1995, pp.590-594)). Producers must form price expectations one period ahead
and derive their optimal production decision from expected proﬁt maximization. Given producers’
price forecast pe
t, optimal supply is given by
S(p
e
t) = argmaxqt fp
e





The cost function c(¢) is assumed to be strictly convex so that the second order condition for
proﬁt maximization is satisﬁed. The marginal cost function is then invertible and supply is strictly
increasing in expected price. The simplest case arises when the cost function is quadratic, c(q) =
3q2=(2s), yielding a linear supply curve
S(p
e) = sp
e; s > 0: (2)
In general a strictly convex cost curve leads to a nonlinear, increasing, supply curve. As an exam-
ple, we will consider an increasing, S-shaped supply curve
S(p
e) = b + arctan(¸p
e); ¸ > 0;b > ¼=2; (3)
where the parameter ¸ tunes the nonlinearity of the supply curve and b > ¼=2 is a parameter tuning
the production level ensuring that production is always non-negative1.
Consumer demand D depends upon the current market price pt. The demand curve D can be
derived from consumer utility maximization, but for our purposes it is not necessary to specify
thesepreferencesexplicitly. Throughoutthechapterwewillsimplyworkwithalinearlydecreasing
demand curve
D(pt) = a ¡ dpt + ²t; a;d > 0; (4)
where ¡d is the slope of the demand curve, a determines the demand level and ²t is an indepen-
dently and identically distributed (IID) stochastic series representing exogenous random demand















With an increasing supply curve and a decreasing demand curve, there can only be one price,
denoted by p = p¤, where demand and supply intersect. The price dynamics in (6) thus depends
upon the demand and supply curves, as well as on the assumed expectations hypothesis. How
do producers form price expectations? We ﬁrst consider the benchmarks of naive, rational and
adaptive expectations.
1An S-shaped supply curve can e.g. be derived from a fourth or higher order polynomial convex cost curve c(q) =
1
d+1(q ¡1)d+1 +q, where d is an odd integer, e.g. d = 3. Optimal supply then becomes q = S(pe) = (pe ¡1)
1
d +1.
42.1 Naive expectations Before the rational expectations revolution it was common practice to
use simple forecasting rules. The simplest case studied in the thirties, e.g. by Ezekiel (1938),
assumes that producers have naive expectations, that is, their prediction equals the last observed
price pe
t = pt¡1. Under naive expectations, the price dynamics (6) becomes
pt = D
¡1(S(pt¡1)): (7)
According to the well known cobweb theorem (see e.g. Ezekiel (1938)), there are essentially
two possibilities for the price dynamics under naive expectations, depending upon the ratio of
marginal supply and marginal demand at the steady state p¤. When ¡1 < S0(p¤)=D0(p¤) < 0
the steady state p¤ is (locally) stable, and prices converge to the steady state. If on the other hand
S0(p¤)=D0(p¤) < ¡1 the steady state p¤ is (locally) unstable, and prices diverge from the steady
state. In the case of a nonlinear, bounded supply curve as in (3), if the steady state is unstable,
prices will converge to a stable 2¡cycle, with regular up and down oscillations, as illustrated in
Figure 2 in the next Section.
2.2 Rational expectations It has been argued that simple forecasting rules such as naive ex-
pectations, lead to systematic forecasting errors. This argument seems particularly strong when
the model generates a 2-cycle, even in the presence of (small) exogenous shocks. When producers
expect a high (low) price, they will supply a high (low) quantity and consequently the realized
market price will be low (high). Along a ‘hog cycle’ of up and down price oscialltions, expecta-
tions are thus systematically wrong, and forecasting errors are strongly correlated. Rational agents
would learn from their systematic errors and revise expectations accordingly, so the argument goes.
These considerations led Muth (1961) to introduce rational expectations, where producers’ sub-
jective price expectations equal the objective conditional mathematical expectation of the market
price, i.e. pe
t = Et[pt]. Using market equilibrium (5) with the linear demand curve (4), taking




t = Et[pt] = p
¤; (8)
5where p¤ is the unique price corresponding to the intersection point of demand and supply. Given
producers’ rational price forecast pe






The cobweb model therefore has a unique REE, given by an IID process with mean p¤. Along
a REE expectations are self fulﬁlling and producers make no systematic forecasting errors, since
forecasting errors are uncorrelated. It is important to note that, in order to form rational expecta-
tions, perfect knowledge of underlying market equilibrium equations is required and, in particular,
agents must be able to compute the intersection point p¤.
2.3 Adaptive expectations It is worthwhile to reconsider the issue of ‘systematic forecasting
errors’ in the light of the recent discovery of chaotic dynamics in simple nonlinear deterministic
systems and under the more plausible assumption of bounded rationality, where agents do not
know underlying market equilibrium equations, but only use time series observations to forecast2.
As an example, consider the cobweb model with adaptive expectations, i.e.,
p
e
t = (1 ¡ w)p
e
t¡1 + wpt¡1; 0 · w · 1; (10)
where w is the expectations weight factor. The expected price is a weighted average of yesterday’s
expected and realized prices, or equivalently, the expected price is adapted by a factor w in the
direction of the most recent realization. Adaptive expectations may thus be seen as ‘error learning’
with a constant factor. Notice that for w = 1, adaptive expectations reduces to naive expectations.
Under adaptive expectations and, given the linear demand curve (4), the dynamics of expected
prices in the cobweb model becomes
p
e
t = (1 ¡ w)p
e
t¡1 + w(




Chiarella (1988) and Hommes (1991,1994) have shown that, without any random shocks ²t, for
nonlinear, but monotonic, demand and/or supply curves, this nonlinear deterministic difference
2At the time of the introduction of rational expectations by Muth (1961) and its introduction into macroeconomics
by Lucas (1972) and others, the phenomenon of deterministic chaos was still largely unknown to economists.
6equation can easily generate chaotic ﬂuctuations in expected prices, and therefore also in prices,
quantities and forecasting errors. Figure 1 shows a bifurcation diagram with respect to the ex-
pectations weight factor w, with the nonlinear, S-shaped supply curve (3). For high values of w,
sufﬁciently close to w = 1 (i.e. close to naive expectations) prices converge to a stable 2-cycle,
whereas for small values of w, sufﬁciently close to w = 0, prices converge to the RE steady state.
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram with respect to the expectations weight factor w, 0:1 · w · 0:7, with
the other parameters ﬁxed at a = 0:7, d = 0:25 and ¸ = 4:8 (x is the deviation from the inﬂection point
of the nonlinear, S-shaped supply curve (3)). For large values of w prices converge to a regular 2-cycle
with large amplitude. As w decreases the amplitude of price ﬂuctuations decreases and a bifurcation
route to chaos occurs. When w becomes very small, chaotic ﬂuctuations are stabilized and prices
converge to REE.
Whenpricesﬂuctuatechaotically, thecorrespondingforecastingerrorswillbehighlyunpredictable
and the question arises whether boundedly rational agents would be able to detect any structure
in these chaotic forecasting errors and improve upon their simple adaptive forecasts. If patterns
are indeed hard to discover, then adaptive expectations with chaotic price ﬂuctuations might be a
satisfactory (long run) boundedly rational equilibrium.
73 Laboratory Experiments
There is a lot of theoretical work on expectations formation and learning when agents are bound-
edly rational, but surprisingly few laboratory experiments with human subjects have been per-
formed to study how individuals form expectations and learn from experience, and how the market
aggregates individual forecasts.
Early experiments on expectations have been done in Schmalensee (1976), who uses historical data
on wheat prices and asks subjects to predict the mean wheat price for the next 5 periods. In Dwyer
et al. (1993) and Hey (1994) subjects have to predict a time series generated by a stochastic process
such as a random walk or a simple linear ﬁrst order autoregressive process. More recently, Kelley
and Friedman (2002) consider learning in an Orange Juice Futures price forecasting experiment,
where prices are driven by a linear stochastic process with two exogenous variables (weather and
competing supply). A drawback of these papers is that subjects are forecasting an exogenous
process, and there is no feedback from individual expectations to realizations.
Williams (1987) considers expectation formation in an experimental double auction market which
varies from period to period by small shifts in the market clearing price. Participants predict the
mean contract price for 4 or 5 consecutive periods. The participant with the lowest forecast error
earns $1.00. Peterson (1993) studies price predictions in repeated double auction experimental
asset markets, as in the famous bubble experiments of Smith et al. (1988), and shows that forecasts
tend to be biased and inconsistent with RE, but there is a tendency of forecasts to evolve in the
direction of RE.
Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) and Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995) have studied ex-
pectation formation in laboratory experiments in inﬂationary overlapping generations economies.
Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) ﬁnd experimental evidence for expectationally driven cycles
and coordination of beliefs on a sunspot 2-cycle equilibrium, but only after agents have been ex-
posed to exogenous shocks of a similar kind. Marimon and Sunder (1995) present experimental
evidence that a “simple” rule, such as a constant growth of the money supply, can help coordinate
agents’ beliefs and help stabilize the economy. More recently, Adam (2007) conducted laboratory
8experiments on inﬂationary expectations.
Here we discuss some recent laboratory experiments of Hommes et al. (2007) on individual ex-
pectations and learning in the cobweb framework. See also Hommes et al. (2005) for similar
experiments in an asset pricing framework. The participants in the experiments were asked to pre-
dict next periods price of a certain, unspeciﬁed, good. The realized price pt in the experiment was









where D(pt) is the demand for the good at price pt, K is the size of the group, pe
i;t is the price
forecast by participant i and S(pe
i;t) is the supply of producer i depending upon the forecast by
participant i. Demand and supply curves D and S were ﬁxed during all experiments (except for
small random shocks to the demand curve) and unknown to the participants. We focus on the
group experiments with K = 6, as in Hommes et al. (2007). Hommes et al. (2000) ran one-person
experiments (i.e. K = 1); Colucci and Valori (2006) use these one-person experiments to estimate
various learning models. Solving (12) for the market equilibrium price, with a linear demand curve









where ²t are IID demand shocks, which are drawn from a normal distribution N(0;0:5). In the
experiments the parameters were ﬁxed at a = 2:3, d = 0:25 and K = 6, and we used the nonlinear,





i;t ¡ 6)) + 1: (14)
Expectation formation of the producers is the only part of the model that is affected by the par-
ticipants in the experiments. Participants did not know underlying market equilibrium equations,
nor were they informed about the distribution of any exogenous shocks to demand and/or supply.
The participants were told that they were advisors to producers of an unspeciﬁed good and that the
9price was determined by market clearing. Based upon this information the participants were asked
to predict next period’s price. The predicted price had to be between 0 and 10 and the realized price
was also always between 0 and 10. Participants’ earnings in each period were a quadratic function
of their squared forecasting error. The better their forecast, the higher their earnings. After every
period the participants were informed about the realized price in the experiment. Also a time series
of the participant’s own prediction and a time series of the realized price in the experiment was
shown on their computer screen.
Participants in the experiments therefore had little information about the price generating process
and had to rely mainly upon time series observations of past prices and predictions. The infor-
mation in the experiment was thus similar to the information assumption underlying much of the
boundedrationalityliterature, whereagentsformexpectationsbasedupontimeseriesobservations.
Our setup enables us to test the expectations hypothesis in a controlled dynamic environment. The
main question was whether agents can learn and coordinate on the unique REE, in a world where
consumers and producers act as if they were maximizing utility and proﬁts, but where they do
not know underlying market equilibrium equations and only observe time series of prices and ex-
pected prices. Our choice for a nonlinear, S-shaped supply curve enables us to investigate whether
agents can avoid systematic forecasting errors, as would e.g. occur along a 2-cycle under naive
expectations, or can even learn a REE steady state.
In their experiment, Hommes et al. (2007) considered a stable and an unstable treatment, which
only differ in the parameter ¸ tuning the nonlinearity of the supply curve (14). In the stable
treatment, if all subjects use naive expectations, prices converge to the RE steady state. In contrast,
in the unstable treatment, if all subjects use naive expectations, prices diverge from the RE steady
stateandconvergetothestable2-cycle, withsystematicforecastingerrors, asillustratedinFigure2
(top left panel). Figure 2 also illustrates what would happen in the unstable treatment of the
experiment if all subjects would use one of the other well known benchmark expectations rules,
namely adaptive expectations (w = 0:2), rational expectations (i.e. use the RE price p¤ as forecast),
10Figure 2: Price ﬂuctuations in the cobweb model under naive expectations (top left), adaptive ex-
pectations (top right), rational expectations (middle left), average price forecast (middle right) and
SAC-learning (bottom).
11Figure 3: Realized market prices in two different cobweb group experiments. In the stable treatment
(left panel; ¸ = 0:22) the price quickly converges to the RE price, whereas in the unstable treatment
(right panel; ¸ = 2)) prices do not converge but exhibit excess volatility, characterized by strongly
ﬂuctuating prices around the RE price.







as forecast as in Carlson (1969)), and sample autocorrelation (SAC) learning (i.e. updating sample
average and ﬁrst order sample autocorrelation coefﬁcient, as discussed in detail in Section 4).
Figure 3 shows time series of the realized prices in two typical group experiments, one stable and
one unstable treatment, and Table 1 summarizes the sample mean and sample variances, over the
subsamples 1–25, 26–50 and the full sample 1–50, for both treatments and for the corresponding
RE benchmarks. For both treatments, the sample mean of realized prices is very close to the
(unknown) RE price. Moreover, in the stable treatment, the sample variance (0:44, 0:29 and 0:36
respectively, over the ﬁrst half, the second half and the full sample) is close to the variance (0:25)
of the RE benchmark. In contrast, in the unstable treatment the sample variance (4:75, 3:32 and
4:04 respectively, over the ﬁrst half, the second half and the full sample) is signiﬁcantly higher than
the variance (0:25) of the RE benchmark, so that the unstable treatment exhibits excess volatility.
Hommes et al. (2007) also look at autocorrelations in realized market prices, and ﬁnd that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant autocorrelations in realized market prices, for both the stable and the
121-25 26-50 1-50
sample sample sample sample sample sample
average variance average variance average variance
Stable treatment (¸ = 0:22)
RE 5.57 0.25 5.57 0.25 5.57 0.25
experiment 5.59 0.44 5.66 0.29 5.63 0.36
unstable treatment (¸ = 2)
RE 5.91 0.25 5.91 0.25 5.91 0.25
experiment 6.07 4.75 5.50 3.32 5.79 4.04
Table 1: Sample mean and sample variance of realized market prices in the laboratory ex-
periments for the stable and the unstable treatment, over the full sample of 50 periods and
over the subsamples of the ﬁrst 25 and the last 25 periods, together with rational expectations
benchmarks.
unstable treatments. Apparently, the heterogeneous interaction of individual forecasting rules has
washed out all linear predictable structure in realized market prices. The stylized facts of realized
market prices in the cobweb experiments may thus be summarized as follows:
1. the sample mean of realized market prices is very close to the RE price;
2. the sample variance of realized market prices depends on the treatment
(a) in the stable treatment the sample variance is very close to the RE benchmark;
(b) in the unstable treatment the sample variance is signiﬁcantly higher than the RE bench-
mark;
3. there is no linear autocorrelation left in realized market prices.
One may say that the stable treatment converges to RE3, whereas the unstable treatment exhibits
excess volatility, with prices ﬂuctuating irregularly (no autocorrelations) and with high amplitude
3For different market settings, these results may off course change. The cobweb model has negative expectations
feedback. Heemeijer et al. (2007) show in fact that the results are quite different in markets with positive feedback,
13around the RE benchmark.
It is useful to compare these experimental results to the theoretical benchmarks illustrated in Fig-
ure 24. These are representative agent benchmarks, where all agents use the same forecasting
rule, and demand and supply are exactly the same as in the unstable treatment in the experiment.
Naive expectations is clearly very different from the experiments, since it leads to high amplitude
price ﬂuctuation with regular, predictable up and down (noisy) period 2 oscillations. Adaptive ex-
pectations is also inconsistent with the experiments. Although the amplitude is smaller, the price
ﬂuctuations are too regular, with frequent up and down oscillations. In contrast to the experiments,
the price series under adaptive expectations, for example, exhibits strong negative ﬁrst order au-
tocorrelation. The time series under rational expectations is very similar to the time series in the
stable treatment (the exogenous shocks in the experiments are the same as for the RE benchmark
simulation), but very different from the unstable treatment, which has a much larger amplitude.
RE is therefore a good description in the stable treatment, but not in the unstable treatment. Fi-
nally, learning by average or by sample autocorrelation always leads to (quick) convergence to
RE, which is inconsistent with the observed excess volatility in the unstable treatment of the ex-
periments. None of these representative agent learning models thus can explain the cobweb ex-
periments, suggesting that heterogeneous expectations play a key role in expectation formation of
boundedly rational agents. Before turning to heterogeneous expectations models in Section 5, we
discuss adaptive learning by an “average agent” in Section 4.
4 Adaptive Learning
Adaptive learning usually refers to the situation where agents use some parameterized rule, and
update the parameters over time as additional observations become available. Agents thus try to
learn the parameters of their rule, for example behaving as a time series econometrician using a
such as demand driven speculative asset markets. Positive feedback may lead to persistent deviations from the funda-
mental benchmark, with the sample mean of realized prices e.g. much higher than the RE fundamental benchmark.
4Arifovic (1994) investigates genetic algorithm learning in the cobweb model and compares the results to the
cobweb experiments of Wellford (1989).
14recursive ordinary least squares (OLS) updating rule. Marcet and Sargent (1989) contains early
examples of such an approach; Evans and Honkapohja (2001) contains an extensive and excel-
lent overview of adaptive learning in macroeconomics. Within the cobweb framework adaptive
learning has been applied by Bray and Savin (1986).
Adaptive learning may provide a learning story how agents may learn a REE, without structural
knowledge of market equilibrium equations but based on time series observations. In fact, we
have seen an example already, since the average price forecast rule (15) can be obtained from
OLS regression of prices on a constant. As we have seen, the average price forecast rule enforces
convergence to the unique REE in the cobweb model. In cases when there are multiple REE,
adaptive learning may be used as an equilibrium selection device, providing a justiﬁcation of RE
equilibria that are stable under learning.
However, adaptive learning need not always converge to REE. In particular, when the perceived
law of motion (i.e. the law of motion agents believe in) is misspeciﬁed (i.e. different from the
true law of motion), the learning process need not converge to a REE steady state, but may lead
to some boundedly rational learning equilibrium, leading to expectations driven periodic or even
chaotic ﬂuctuations. Well known examples are Bullard (1994), Sch¨ onhofer (1999)5, and Bullard
and Duffy (1998); Grandmont (1998) contains a discussion of (in-)stability conditions of adaptive
learning rules. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) use the notion of restricted perception equilibria
to describe a situation where agents’ perceived law of motion is misspeciﬁed, and agents try to
learn a rule which is optimal within a limited class of misspeciﬁed rules. Branch (2006) wrote a
stimulating recent review on restricted perception equilibria, and their importance for macro.
The purpose of this section is to discuss a simple adaptive learning scheme, sample autocorrelation
(SAC-)learning, as introduced by Hommes and Sorger (1998). In this setting agents are trying
to learn the best linear rule (according to forecasting performance) in an unknown, nonlinear
5Recently Tuinstra and Wagener (2007) have argued that cycles and chaos are the result of the estimation procedure
in Bullard (1994) and Sch¨ onhofer (1999). If agents regress inﬂation rates on a constant, instead of regressing (nonsta-
tionary) prices on past prices, adaptive learning does converge to REE. Interestingly, Tuinstra and Wagener (2007) also
show that in the case of heterogeneous agents, with agents switching between the two estimation procedures based
upon past performance, complicated price ﬂuctuations arise again.
15economy. In equilibrium the linear rule has the same autocorrelation structure as the unknown
nonlinear system, and Hommes and Sorger (1998) called this situation a consistent expectations
equilibrium. Within the cobweb model, we will see that SAC-learning may sometimes converge to
a REE steady state, but may also fail to converge and even lead to chaotic ﬂuctuations and excess
volatility.
4.1 ConsistentExpectationsEquilibrium(CEE) Westartfromamotivatingexampleinchaos
theory. Consider the dynamics
xt+1 = T¯(xt); (16)
where ¡1 < ¯ < +1 and T¯(x) : [0;1] ! [0;1] is the 1-D piecewise linear asymmetric tent map
(see the graphs in Figure 4)
T¯(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2






2 < x · 1:
(17)
This piecewise linear map is expanding, that is, jT 0
¯(x) > 1, and typical trajectories are chaotic.
In particular, the following properties of the dynamics are well known (Bunow and Weiss (1979),
Sakai and Tokumaru (1980)):
1. almost all time paths fxtg1
t=0 are chaotic and dense in [0;1].
2. for almost all initial states x0 2 [0;1], the sample average of the (chaotic) time path is




t=0 xt = 1
2.
3. for almost all initial states x0 2 [0;1], the sample autocorrelation coefﬁcient at lag j is
½j = ¯j.
These properties imply that the nonlinear dynamical system (16) has the same autocorrelation
structure as a stochastic AR(1) process. Boundedly rational agents observing time series gener-
ated by the unknown nonlinear process (16) and using linear statistical techniques, might wrongly








￿a￿ ￿￿￿0.7 and x0￿0.45








￿b￿ ￿￿0 and x0￿0.66








￿c￿ ￿￿0.7 and x0￿0.1
Figure 4: Graphs of the asymmetric tentmap for different values of the parameter ¯. In each case, a
typical trajectory is chaotic with sample mean 1=2. The ﬁrst order sample autorcorrelation coefﬁcient
of a chaotic trajectory equals ¯.
17believe that the time series is generated by a stochastic AR(1) process. This example motivated the
concept of consistent expectations equilibrium, introduced in Hommes and Sorger (1998), building
on earlier work in Hommes (1998) and Sorger (1998), and the concept of self-fulﬁlling mistake of
Grandmont (1998).
We discuss the CEE concept within the cobweb model. Assume that agents believe that prices are
generated by a stochastic AR(1) process. Given this perceived law of motion and prices known up
to pt¡1, the predictor for pt minimizing the mean squared prediction error is
p
e
t = ® + ¯(pt¡1 ¡ ®); (18)
where the parameters ® and ¯, ¯ 2 [¡1;1], represent the long run average and the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation coefﬁcient. Given that agents use the linear predictor (18), the implied actual law
of motion for the cobweb model becomes
pt = F®;¯(pt¡1) := D
¡1S(® + ¯(pt¡1 ¡ ®)): (19)
The sample average of a time series (pt)1
t=0 is deﬁned as



















(pt ¡ ¹ p)(pt+j ¡ ¹ p); j ¸ 0: (22)
A CEE is now deﬁned as
DEFINITION. A triple f(pt)1
t=0;®;¯g, where (pt)1
t=0 is a sequence of prices and ® and ¯ are real
numbers, ¯ 2 [¡1;1], is called a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) if
1. the sequence (pt)1
t=0 satisﬁes the implied actual law of motion (19),
182. the sample average ¹ p in (20) exists and is equal to ®, and
3. the sample autocorrelation coefﬁcients ½j, j ¸ 1, in (21) exist and the following is true:
a. if (pt)1
t=0 is a convergent sequence, then sgn(½j) = sgn(¯j), j ¸ 1;
b. if (pt)1
t=0 is not convergent, then ½j = ¯j, j ¸ 1.
Stated differently, a CEE is a price sequence together with an AR(1) belief such that expectations
are self-fulﬁlling in terms of the observable sample average and sample autocorrelations. Along a
CEE expectations are thus correct in a linear statistical sense.
4.2 Sample Autocorrelation Learning So far, the notion of CEE involves a given AR(1) be-
lief, with ﬁxed parameters ® and ¯. Now consider the more ﬂexible situation of adaptive learning
with agents updating their AR(1) belief parameters ®t and ¯t over time, as additional observations
become available. A natural learning scheme ﬁtting the framework of CEE is based upon sample
average and sample autocorrelation coefﬁcients.






pi ; t ¸ 1 (23)
and the ﬁrst order sample autocorrelation coefﬁcient is
¯t =
Pt¡1
i=0(pi ¡ ®t)(pi+1 ¡ ®t)
Pt
i=0(pi ¡ ®t)2 ; t ¸ 1: (24)
When, in each period, the belief parameters are updated according to (23) and (24) the (temporary)
law of motion (19) becomes
pt+1 = F®t;¯t(pt) = D
¡1S(®t + ¯t(pt ¡ ®t)); t ¸ 0: (25)
We call the dynamical system (23) - (25) the actual dynamics with sample autocorrelation learning
(SAC-learning)6. The initial state for the system (23– 25) can be any triple (p0;®0;¯0) with ¯0 2
[¡1;1].
6SAC-learning is closely related to OLS-learning. For both learning schemes ®t is the same, but ¯t has one extra
term in the denominator under SAC-learning, ensuring that ¡1 · ¯t · +1. Simulations for OLS-learning lead to
similar results and would not change our general conclusions below.
19Which type of CEE exist in the cobweb model, and to which of them will the SAC-learning dy-
namics converge? Hommes and Sorger (1998) show that in the most relevant case, when demand
is decreasing and supply is increasing, the only CEE is the RE steady state price p¤. This means
that, even when underlying market equilibrium equations are not known, agents should be able
to learn and coordinate on the REE price simply by looking at sample averages and sample auto-
correlations. Although other simple forecasting rules, such as adaptive expectations, might lead
to chaotic price ﬂuctuations, these forecasting rules are inconsistent in terms of sample autocorre-
lations. Hence, in a nonlinear cobweb economy with monotonic demand and supply, boundedly
rational agents should, at least in theory, be able to learn the unique REE from time series obser-
vations7.
In general however, given an AR(1) belief, there are at least three possible types of CEE:
² a steady state CEE in which the price sequence (pt)1
t=0 converges to a steady state p¤, with
® = p¤ and ¯ = 0;
² a 2-cycle CEE in which the price sequence (pt)1





2, with ® = (p¤
1 + p¤
2)=2 and ¯ = ¡1;
² a chaotic CEE in which the price sequence (pt)1
t=0 is chaotic, with sample average ® and
autocorrelations ¯j.
Which of these cases occurs in the cobweb model depends on the composite mapping D¡1S in
(19), determined by demand and supply curves. We will discuss a chaotic example below.
4.3 CEE in a ﬁshery model with backward bending supply As an illustration of chaotic
CEE, we brieﬂy discuss the ﬁshery model in Hommes and Rosser (2001), with a backward bending
supply curve derived from optimal management of the ﬁsh resources, by a sole owner maximizing
7Bray and Savin (1986) show that OLS learning also converges to the REE steady state in the cobweb model.
Arifovic (1994) shows that agents using genetic algorithms can learn the REE steady state.
20discounted revenues from harvesting. The backward bending supply curve is given by









Supply equals harvest h, which in sustained yield equilibrium has been set equal to the (logistic)
growth of the ﬁsh population x. Moreover, x¤
±(p) is the optimal bioeconomic equilibrium ﬁsh
population derived from maximization of discounted future net revenues, which depends on the
discount rate ± and the ﬁsh price p. In the case of logistic growth of the ﬁsh population and a

























for an extensive treatment of ﬁshery and other renewable resource models8.
































Figure 5: (a) Graphs of the demand and the discounted equilibrium supply curves S± in (26) (left
panel) and (b) graphs of the implied law of motion G± in (29) under naive expectations (right panel)
for several discount factors ±. As the discount factor ± increases the supply curve becomes strongly
backward bending and two additional steady states are created for ± ¼ 0:085.
We refer to S±(p) in (26) as the discounted equilibrium supply curve. For consumer demand for
ﬁsh, we will choose the same linear form (4) as before. Figure 5 shows plots of the equilibrium
8Parameters will be ﬁxed as follows: the ﬁsh carrying capacity k = 400:000, catchability (per vessel per day)
q = 0:000013, the marginal cost of effort c = 5000 and the growth rate of ﬁsh r = 0:05.
21demand and supply system, for different values of the discount rate ±9. Figure 5 (left panel) shows
that, as the discount rate ± increases, the supply curve becomes more backward bending. The
most backwardly bent supply curve corresponds with the totally myopic case of ± = 1, which
corresponds to the open access bionomic equilibrium case studied by Gordon (1954) and which is
associated with overﬁshing behavior. We note that the supply curve bends backwards quite quickly
at values of the discount rate that are empirically and socially meaningful. Figure 5 illustrates the
fact that a backward-bending supply curve together with a sufﬁciently inelastic demand curve may
lead to multiple steady state equilibria even for the static case. In the extreme case ± = 0 there
is a unique steady state equilibrium price, whereas at the other extreme ± = +1 there are three
different steady state equilibrium prices.




With linear consumer demand D as before in (4), the discounted supply curve S± in (26), and price
expectations given by SAC-learning, the implied actual law of motion becomes
pt+1 = G±(®t +¯t(pt ¡®t)) = D
¡1S±(®t +¯t(pt ¡®t)) =
a ¡ S±(®t + ¯t(pt ¡ ®t))
d
; (29)
with ®t given by (23) and ¯t by (24). Figure 5 (right panel) shows graphs of the implied actual
law of motion G±, for different values of the discount rate. In our simulations of the adaptive
SAC-learning process (23), (24) and (29), we have observed three typical outcomes:
² convergence to the “good” steady state equilibrium with a low price and a high ﬁsh stock
² convergence to the “bad” steady state equilibrium with a high price and a low ﬁsh stock
² convergence to a chaotic CEE, with prices and ﬁsh stock irregularly jumping between low
and high values
Simulations of the SAC-learning dynamics suggest that for low values of the discount rate con-
vergence to the “good” equilibrium steady state is the most likely outcome of the SAC learning
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Figure 6: Learning to believe in chaos, that is, belief parameters converge (bottom panels), while
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Figure 7: Learning to believe in noisy chaos, that is, belief parameters converge (bottom panels), while
dynamics of prices and forecasts (top panel) follow a noisy chaotic process. In this example, belief
parameters (®t;¯t) ! (®¤;¯¤) ¼ (5200;¡0:8).
24process, whereas for high values of the discount rate convergence to the “bad” steady state is most
likely. For intermediate discount rates the outcome of the learning process is uncertain and in
general depends on the initial states, i.e. on the initial belief parameters ®0, ¯0 and the initial ﬁsh
stock x0. The system may settle down to either the “good” or the “bad” steady state, possibly after
a long (chaotic) transient. However, it may also happen that belief parameters ®t and ¯t converge
to constants ®¤ and ¯¤, while prices never converge to a steady state (or to a cycle), but keep ﬂuc-
tuating chaotically, as illustrated in Figure 6 for ± = 0:1. This situation is referred to as learning
to believe in chaos and it seems to occur with positive probability, that is, for an open set of initial
states (x0;®0;¯0). Learning to believe in chaos means that the SAC-learning dynamics converges
to a chaotic system, when ®t and ¯t have converged to constants ®¤ and ¯¤, while prices keep
ﬂuctuating chaotically10.
Next we investigate the effect of noise upon the learning dynamics. SAC-learning with additive
dynamic noise is given by (23), (24), as before, and adding a noise term to the implied actual law
of motion, i.e.
pt+1 = G±;®t;¯t(pt) = G±(®t + ¯t(pt ¡ ®t)) + ²t; t ¸ 0; (30)
where ²t is an independently identically distributed (IID) random process and G± = D¡1S± in (29)
as before. Notice that the noise is not merely observational noise, but dynamic noise, e.g. due to
exogenous demand or supply shocks, affecting the dynamic law of motion in each period of time.
Figure 7 illustrates a typical example, with ²t drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval
[¡1000;+1000]; for this choice of the noise process, the signal to noise ratio, as measured by the
ratio ¾p=¾² of standard deviations of the noise free price series to the noise, is about 5. Surprisingly,
even in the presence of dynamic noise, the SAC-learning dynamics still settles down to a chaotic
CEE as illustrated in Figure 7. The noisy chaotic series has an autocorrelation pattern very similar
to that of an AR(1) process with strongly negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation. In fact, estimation of
an AR(1) process of the noisy chaotic series yields estimated parameters ^ ¯ and ^ ® which are close
10Sch¨ onhofer (1999, 2001) presents a related case of learning to believe in chaos in an OLG-model. In Sch¨ onhofer’s
examples belief parameters of the OLS-learning scheme do not converge but keep ﬂuctuating chaotically, while at the
same time, due to inﬂation, prices diverge to inﬁnity.
25to the coefﬁcients of the underlying chaotic CEE ¯¤ ¼ ¡0:87 and ®¤ ¼ 4988. Standard statistical
tests such as the Q-statistic indicate that the null hypothesis that prices follow a stochastic AR(1)
process can not be rejected, not even at the 10% level. Learning to believe in noisy chaos is thus a
possibility which is not rejected by linear statistical theory. Agents are therefore satisﬁed with their
linear forecasting rules, and have no reason to abandon their belief and will stick to their AR(1)
belief in an unknown stochastic nonlinear economy.
The key feature of a (noisy) chaotic CEE is that learning parameters converge to constants, whereas
prices do not converge but ﬂuctuate chaotically on a (noisy) strange attractor, with the correct sam-
ple averageand sample autocorrelations A chaotic CEE may be seen as an exampleof what Sargent
(1993)callsanapproximaterationalexpectationsequilibrium, withoptimalmisspeciﬁedforecasts.
A chaotic CEE is not a REE, because expectations do not coincide with the conditional mathemat-
ical expectations, which could only be derived if underlying market equilibrium equations would
be known. Agents are using a simple, but misspeciﬁed model to forecast an unknown, possibly
complicated actual law of motion. In the presence of (small) dynamic noise, the misspeciﬁcation
is hard to detect and boundedly rational agents using linear statistical techniques can do no better
than stick to their optimal, simple linear model of an unknown stochastic, nonlinear economy.
5 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Evolutionary Selection
So far we have focused on a representative agent cobweb model, where all producers have identical
expectations. But why would all agents have the same expectations? Laboratory experiments
have shown that, even when individuals face the same information, they may disagree and take
different decisions. In a complex market it seems more appropriate to model agents as boundedly
rational and heterogeneous, using different types of forecasting rules. But this raises an immediate
problem: which rules will boundedly rational agents choose from the inﬁnitely many possibilities?
Models with heterogeneous agents are becoming increasingly popular. In particular, in ﬁnance
models with fundamentalists and chartists have received much attention. Examples include Zee-
man (1974), Frankel and Froot (1986), DeLong et al. (1990), Kirman (1991), Lux (1995), Brock
26and Hommes (1998) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006). Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006)
have recently reviewed this rapidly expanding literature.
In this section we discuss a model with heterogeneous expectations, as proposed in Brock and
Hommes (1997) (henceforth BH) based on three underlying assumptions: (i) agents choose from a
class of rules varying from very simple to very sophisticated; (ii) more sophisticated rules require
more effort and are therefore more costly than simple rules, and (iii) agents tend to switch to
rules that have performed better in the recent past. Evolutionary selection thus disciplines the
forecasting rules to be used. In the cobweb framework, producers can choose between different
forecasting rules Hj. The fractions nj;t of producers using predictor Hj at date t, will be updated
over time based upon a publically available evolutionary ﬁtness measure, given by realized net
proﬁts, associated to each predictor.
BH focus on a simple two type case with rational expectations, which can be obtained at costs
C ¸ 0 per time period, versus naive expectations, which is freely available. This case may be
viewed as an extreme case, with rational expectations representing the most sophisticated forecast-
ing rule, and naive expectations representing the simplest forecasting rule. BH show the occur-
rence of a rational route to randomness, i.e. a bifurcation route to strange attractors and chaos as
traders become more rational in the sense that they become more sensitive to differences in past
performance and switch more quickly to a better predictor.
Rational agents have perfect knowledge about market equilibrium equations and are aware of the
fact that the market equilibrium price is affected by the presence of naive traders. Hence, in a
heterogeneous world rational agents have perfect knowledge about prices and quantities, but also
about beliefs of all other traders. Although this case is theoretically appealing, it seems highly un-
realistic in real markets that some agents have (perfect) information about beliefs of other agents.
Therefore we will focus here on some perhaps more realistic cases, where agents only use infor-
mation extracted from observable quantities, such as prices. As a starting point of the discussion,
we consider the case of two simple linear predictors. Two special cases will be discussed, the case
of fundamentalists versus naive expectations and the case of contrarians versus naive.
275.1 Linear forecasting rules Consider the two linear AR(1) prediction rules
Hj(pt¡1) = ®j + ¯jpt¡1; j = 1;2; (31)
with ﬁxed parameters ®j and ¯j. Throughout this section we focus on the case where the supply
curve is linear as in (2), with corresponding cost function c(q) = q2=(2s). The market clear-
ing price in the cobweb model with linear demand and supply and two trader types, with linear
predictors as in (31), is determined by11
a ¡ dpt = n1ts(®1 + ¯1pt¡1) + n2ts(®2 + ¯2pt¡1); (32)
where n1t and n2t denote the fractions of agents using respectively H1 and H2, at the beginning of
period t. These fractions will be updated according to an evolutionary ﬁtness measure based on
past realized proﬁts. Realized net proﬁt in period t for traders using predictor Hj is given by




2 ¡ Cj; (33)
where Cj represents the average costs per time period for obtaining predictor Hj. For a simple
habitual rule of thumb predictor, such as naive or adaptive expectations, these costs Cj will be
zero, whereas for more sophisticated predictors such as fundamentalists beliefs based on funda-
mental analysis, information gathering costs Cj may be positive. The ﬁtness measure underlying
evolutionary selection is given by
Ujt = wUj;t¡1 + (1 ¡ w)¼j;t; (34)
where 0 · w · 1 is a memory parameter. A smaller w puts more memory on recent observations
and in the case w ¡ 0 ﬁtness is given by most recent observed realized net proﬁts.
Brock and Hommes (1997) considered this model with synchronous updating of strategies, that
is, in each period all agents update their strategies. Here we consider the more general case of
asynchronous updating. Per time unit only a fraction 1 ¡ ± of agents, distributed randomly among
11In our simulations we will work in deviations xt = pt ¡ p¤ from the fundamental RE steady state price p¤. This
is equivalent to setting the parameter a = 0, so that the RE steady state p¤ = a=(d + s) = 0.
28agents of both types and independently across time, is assumed to reconsider their strategy on
the basis of the most recent information available. The remaining fraction ± sticks to their current
strategy. The corresponding dynamics of the fractions is given by a modiﬁed version of the discrete
choice, logit probabilities:
njt = (1 ¡ ±)e
°Uj;t¡1=Zt¡1 + ±nj;t¡1; (35)
where Zt¡1 =
P
h e°Uh;t¡1 is a normalization factor so that fractions add up to 1. For ± = 0, we
are back in the case of synchronous updating. In evolutionary games there has been a discussion
whether asynchronous updating may lead to more stability (cf. Nowak and May (1992), Huberman
andGlance (1993) and Nowaket al. (1994)). Financial marketmodels withasynchronous updating
have been considered by Diks and van der Weide (2005) and Hommes, Huang and Wang (2005).
A key feature of this evolutionary predictor selection is that agents are boundedly rational, in the
sense that predictors with higher evolutionary ﬁtness attract more followers. The parameter ° is
called the intensity of choice, measuring how fast producers switch between different prediction
strategies. For ° = 0 the fractions always converge to equal shares 1=H, whereas for the other
extreme ° = 1, in each period all producers who update in that period (i.e., a fraction 1 ¡ ±)
switch to the optimal predictor. Hence, the higher the intensity of choice, the more rational agents
are in the sense that they switch more quickly to the best strategy in terms of past performance.
The timing of the coupling between the market equilibrium equation (32) and the evolutionary
selection of strategies (35) is important. The market equilibrium price pt in (32) depends upon the
fractions nht. These fractions nht depend upon past ﬁtness Uh;t¡1, which in turn depends upon
past prices pt¡1 in periods t ¡ 1 and further in the past. After the equilibrium price pt has been
revealed by the market, it is used in evolutionary updating of beliefs and determining the new
fractions nh;t+1. These new fractions nh;t+1 will then determine a new equilibrium price pt+1.
Market equilibrium prices and fractions of different trading strategies thus co-evolve over time.
5.2 Fundamentalists versus naive expectations The linear predictors (39) specialize to the
case with fundamentalists versus naive expectations when ®1 = p¤ = a=(d + s) (the steady state






H2(pt¡1) = pt¡1: (37)
Figure 8 shows attractors for different values of the intensity of choice ° and some corresponding
time series. The Bifurcation diagram and largest LE-plot in Figure 9 illustrate a rational route to
randomness, i.e. a bifurcation route from simple to complicated, chaotic dynamics as the intensity
of choice increases. The market switches between periods of low volatility, with prices close to
the fundamental price, and high volatility, with irregularly switching prices. Prices diverge slowly
from the fundamental steady state price, as long as most agents use the simple, freely available
naive forecast. When forecasting errors increase, it becomes worthwhile to buy the sophisticated
fundamental forecast, and more agents start switching to the fundamental forecast, thus stabiliz-
ing price ﬂuctuations, etc. Due to the asynchronous updating of strategies, agents switch more
gradually between strategies, and the time series of fractions of fundamentalists shows much more
persistence than in the case with synchronous updating. Figure 8 (bottom panel) also illustrates
the sample average and ﬁrst order sample autocorrelation (SAC) of the price series. Sample aver-
age quickly settles down to a value close to 012, whereas the ﬁrst order SAC is clearly negative,
converging to approx. ¡0:85.
It is remarkable that both the attractor and the price time series are similar to the case of rational
versus naive expectations studied in BH, and in particular for ° large, the system is close to a
homoclinic tangency13.
5.3 Contrarians versus naive expectations In the case of fundamentalists versus naive, price
series exhibit strong ﬁrst order negative autocorrelations, even when the dynamics is chaotic. This
12Recall that the simulations are in deviations xt = pt ¡ p¤ from the fundamental, so that the sample average of
prices converges to fundamental value.
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(f) ° = 3: sample autocorrelation of prices
Figure 8: Fundamentalists versus naive. Strange attractors and time series for different °-
values, with other parameters ﬁxed at a = 0, d = 0:5, s = 1:35, ± = 0:5, ®1 = 0, ¯1 = 0,
C1 = 1, ®2 = 0, ¯2 = 1 and C2 = 0. Although price dynamics is chaotic, there is still
clear linear autocorrelation structure. Sample average of prices converges (close ) to funda-
mental value, while sample autocorrelations converge (close) to¡0:85, indicating signiﬁcantly
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(b) Lyuapunov exponent plot
Figure 9: Fundamentalists versus naive: a rational route to randomness as the intensity of
choice increases. Parameters: a = 0, d = 0:5, s = 1:35, ± = 0:5, ®1 = 0, ¯1 = 0, C1 = 1,
®2 = 0, ¯2 = 1 and C2 = 0.
has been illustrated in Figure 8 showing that, for ° = 3, the sample autocorrelations of prices
converges to a negative value around ¡0:85. An agent who behaves as a time series econometri-
cian would easily detect this strong negative autocorrelation and adapt her forecasts. Even without
the use of any statistical software, a smart agent might detect negative autocorrelation, simply by
observing that positive (negative) deviations from the average price are always followed by neg-
ative (positive) deviations. What would happen if agents recognize this structure from observing
realized market prices?
Consider a group of contrarians, who take the negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation in prices into
account, and predict that next period’s deviation from the fundamental price will be on the opposite
side, that is, we replace the fundamental forecast by a contrarian rule
H1(pt¡1) = p
¤ + ¯1(pt¡1 ¡ p
¤): (38)
Figure 10 illustrates an example with ¯1 = ¡0:85 (with other parameters as in Figure 8), that is,
contrarians recognize the autocorrelation structure present in the previous example. The structure
of the strange attractors in Figure 10 seems more complicated than in the case of fundamentalists
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(d) ° = 3: sample autocorrelation of prices
Figure 10: Contrarians versus naive. Strange attractors (top panel) for different °-values, with
other parameters ﬁxed at: a = 0, d = 0:5, s = 1:35, ± = 0:5, ®1 = 0, ¯1 = ¡0:85, C1 = 1,
®2 = 0, ¯2 = 1 and C2 = 0. Time series of sample average and (ﬁrst order) sample autocor-
relation converge. Compared to fundamentalists, contrarians weaken the negative ﬁrst order
autocorrelations in prices, and in the long run sample autocorrelations converge to ¡0:57.
33the sample autocorrelation ½t ! ¡0:57 (instead of ¡0:85). Due to the presence of contrarians in
the market, the strongly negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation has become weaker14. In a sense,
contrarians have “arbitraged away, at least partly, predictable linear structure in the price time
series15.
5.4 Adaptive learning versus naive expectations In this subsection, we combine evolutionary
strategy selection and adaptive learning. In the previous example we have seen that the presence of
contrarians in the market weakens the ﬁrst order autocorrelations in realized prices. A time series
econometrician might note however, that contrarian behaviour is still inconsistent with realized
prices since contrarians expect strong negative autocorrelation ¯2 = ¡0:85, while realized prices
exhibit weaker SAC, with ﬁrst order SAC ¯t ! ¡0:57. It is natural to go one step further and
introduce a type of agent with adaptive learning, trying to optimize the parameters of her linear
forecasting rule:
H1(pt¡1) = ®t¡1 + ¯t¡1(pt¡1 ¡ ®t¡1); (39)
where ®t and ¯t are determined through SAC-learning as in (23) and (24) respectively. This ap-
proach widens the range of forecasting rules to all linear AR(1) rules. The sophisticated agent
type tries to learn the optimal linear rule through adaptive learning, within a heterogeneous agent
environment. Recently, Branch and Evans (2006) have studied a related cobweb model with two
types of agents, both using OLS-learning of a misspeciﬁed model, and allowing for endogenous,
evolutionary switching between the two predictors. DeGrauwe and Markiewicz (2006) compare
evolutionarylearningandadaptive(orstatistical)learninginanassetpricingframework, andinves-
tigate how these different learning schemes replicate the stylized facts (disconnect puzzles, excess
volatility) in exchange rates. Diks and Dindo (2006) consider an asset pricing model with hetero-
geneous information combining adaptive learning of the growth rate of dividends and evolutionary
switching between free riding and costly information gathering.
14The attractors in Figure 10 suggest that there are transversal intersections between the stable and the unstable
manifolds of the steady state. Apparently homoclinic bifurcations are weakening the autocorrelation structure.
15See Dindo (2006) and Dindo and Tuinstra (2006) for similar results in the context of the well known El-Farol bar
problem and related models.
34Figure 11 illustrates the dynamics in the case of SAC-learning versus naive expectations. Agents
learn to be contrarians, as ¯t ! ¡0:62, consistent with the SAC in realized prices. In this example
there is still fairly strong negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation in prices, but it is consistent with the
behavior of the sophisticated type, who have learned the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coefﬁcient
consistent with realized market prices. Figure 12 illustrates an example with memory in the ﬁtness
measure, where the (ﬁrst order) autocorrelation in prices becomes even weaker (¯t ! ¡0:48).
6 Concluding Remarks
We have reviewed bounded rationality and learning in the familiar cobweb, hog-cycle framework.
Two stories of bounded rationality have been emphasized. The story of adaptive learning as-
sumes a representative “average” agent trying to optimize a simple, (linear) misspeciﬁed rule in
an unknown complex (nonlinear) economy. The other story assumes heterogeneous forecasting
strategies and endogenous, evolutionary selection based upon past performance. We have also
presented an example where both stories are integrated, with evolutionary selection between an
adaptive learning rule and a simple, ﬁxed rule.
In a cobweb economy with nonlinear, monotonic demand and supply curves, many adaptive learn-
ing processes enforce convergence to the unique REE steady state price. The steady state price
forecast is e.g. the only (linear) forecast, where sample averages and sample autocorrelations of
realized market prices are consistent with beliefs. Simply by looking at sample averages and sam-
ple autocorrelations, in particular trying to learn the negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation so typical
for the ‘hog cycle’, boundedly rational agents should be able to learn the unique REE.
Laboratory experiments with human subjects show however that this is not as easy as theory sug-
gests. Only in the stable treatment of the experiment (i.e. when the market is stable under naive
expectations) do market prices converge to REE. In the unstable treatment of the experiments, real-
ized market prices are characterized by three stylized facts: (i) the sample mean is close to the RE
price; (ii) there is excess volatility, i.e., the sample variance is much higher than the RE variance,
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Figure 11: SAC-learning versus naive. Agents learn to be contrarians, as the ﬁrst order autocorrelation
coefﬁcient converges, ¯t ! ¡0:62. The bifurcation diagram shows a rational route to randomness, as
the intensity of choice ° increases. Parameters: a = 0, d = 0:5, s = 1:35, ± = 0:5, w = 0, C1 = 1,
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(e) sample autocorrelation coefﬁcient
Figure 12: SAC-learning versus naive expectations with memory in the ﬁtness measure. Attractor (a)
andtime seriesof prices pt (deviationsfromfundamental), fractionn1t ofSAC-learners, sample average
®t and sample autocorrelation coefﬁcient ¯t. With more memory in the ﬁtness meausure, the remaining
autocorrelation in prices is weaker (¯t ! ¡0:48). Parameters: ° = 3, a = 0, d = 0:5, b = 1:35,
± = 0:5, w = 0:9, C1 = 1, ®2 = 0, ¯2 = 1 and C2 = 0.
37cess volatility is inconsistent with convergence of adaptive learning of a representative agent. For
other simple expectations rules, such as adaptive expectations, irregular price ﬂuctuations around
the RE benchmark arise, but these ﬂuctuations, even when chaotic, typically still exhibit negative
ﬁrst order autocorrelations, inconsistent with stylized fact (iii) in the experiments. Some form of
heterogeneity is therefore needed to explain the laboratory experiments.
We have also reviewed some results on heterogeneous agent models with endogenous, evolution-
ary strategy selection, including several two-type cases with a costly sophisticated forecasting rule
(fundamentalists, contrarians or SAC-learning) versus a free, simple forecasting rule (naive ex-
pectations). These two type models will converge to the RE price in the stable treatment of the
experiment, and at the same time may generate instability and excess volatility in the unstable
treatment, when agents switch fast enough between strategies, similar to the stylized facts in the
experiments. However, it is not clear whether a two type model can simultaneously explain styl-
ized fact (iii), i.e. linear unpredictability. A two type model with fundamentalists versus naive
expectations generates strongly negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation in prices, even when the sys-
tem is chaotic. The typical up and down ‘hog cycle’ oscillations are still present, and would be
observable to a careful agent. When fundamentalists are replaced by contrarians, who try to ex-
ploit the negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation in prices, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation gets weaker,
but does not disappear completely. When contrarians are replaced by SAC-learning the results are
similar, ﬁrst order autocorrelation becomes weaker but again does not completely vanish. In the
cobweb framework, adaptive agents learn to become contrarians and “arbitrage away” part of the
linear predictability, but do not completely wash out the autocorrelations in market prices. These
resultssuggestthat, inordertomatchallstylizedfactsoftheexperiments, eitherthesimplestrategy
(naive expectations) in these 2-type models needs to be replaced by a somewhat more complicated
strategy (perhaps adaptive expectations or a 2-period average forecast), or more heterogeneity, i.e.
more types of forecasting rules, are needed to fully explain the laboratory experiments. Matching
the stylized facts of laboratory experiments on expectations formation remains an important chal-
lenge for theories of bounded rationality and learning, in the simple cobweb framework as well as
for other, more realistic expectations feedback settings.
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